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Abstract
The research within presents the use of Hidden Markov Models (HMM) for the detection of wireless devices in
highly noisy environments using their unintended electromagnetic emissions (UEE). All electromagnetic devices emit
such radiation that is unique to the electronics, housing, and other device attributes. This pattern recognition system
can provide continuous detection analysis and can provide ideal information regarding the distance to an unknown
device. An experiment was performed where UEE of a device was detected by a spectrum analyzer. Experimental
result shows that our model can accurately detect if there is a device nearby emitting UEE or not.
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1. Introduction
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are extensively used by terrorist to attack their enemies. Radio
frequency (RF) receivers are primarily used as detonators of these IEDs. There are two ways RF receivers
can be used as triggers. One way is to wire the explosive material to the RF receiver directly. A call is
then made to that phone which results in the generation of a small charge. This causes the trigger to the
wired IED which results in explosion. This method is called „call in‟ technique. Another technique is to
set a timer using the internal alarm of the RF receiver. The IED will detonate when the alarm is triggered
[1].
A large number of coalition fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq are due to the IEDs. Table 1 illustrates
the number of coalition fatalities in Afghanistan and the number and percentage of fatalities attributed to
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IEDs. If we consider the total coalition fatalities of 2,683 in and around Afghanistan, IEDs are responsible
for 42% of deaths [2]. Refer to table 1 for data. If we just consider 2,156 hostile fatalities of the coalition
force, then IEDs are responsible for a staggering 52% of all fatalities. If we can somehow detect IEDs that
are present nearby, the number of coalition death can be significantly reduced not only in and around
Afghanistan, but in other hostile environment where this form of terrorism exists. This shows that
detection and localization of RF receivers in a hostile territory could be an effective approach to reduce
the number of fatalities.

Year

Coalition
Fatalities in
Afghanistan

Fatalities
Attributed
to IED

Percentage
Attributed
to IED

2001

12

0

0%

2002

70

4

6%

2003

58

3

5%

2004

60

12

20%

2005

131

20

15%

2006

191

41

21%

2007

232

78

34%

2008

295

152

52%

2009

521

275

53%

2010

711

368

52%

2011

402

177

44%

Total

2683

1130

42%

Table 1: Coalition Fatalities in Afghanistan

All RF receivers produce unintended electromagnetic emissions (UEE) [3]. RF receivers are based on
superheterodyne receiver architecture of Edwin Armstrong. This architecture uses local oscillator (LO) as
a necessary component of the receiver. Some of the electromagnetic emission inevitably leaks from the
LO and is emitted from the antennae of the RF receivers as UEE. This process is explained in [4]. The
emissions also depend on specific electronics and the housing of the device. If we identify UEEs of
possible explosives in hostile area, IEDs can be safely deactivated prior to causing harm.
Unfortunately, UEEs are very weak in power and is thus difficult to detect, at least from a significant
distance. The challenge is to identify such signal in the presence of noise. Some progress has been done in
this area. Neural Network has successfully been employed to identify and locate electronic devices up to a
distance of 10m [5]. Dong et al. (2006) have successfully identified three vehicles based on their RF
emissions using neural networks [6]. But as noted by them, the problem with these approaches is that all
these methods are sensitive to noise. A noble approach of using statistical correlation to identify
unintended emissions from a toy truck is given in [7]. A biconical antenna was used and the
measurements were taken by oscilloscope for time domain and spectrum analyzer for frequency domain.
Ideal unintended electromagnetic emission pulse was constructed from the observations using the
cascading correlation procedure. The cascaded signal is finally normalized by the maximum value to get
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an ideal pulse. The detection is done by correlating the test signal with ideal pulse. A threshold correlation
value is identified above which the signals are assumed from the particular device. This method can
identify devices up to a distance of 40m with an accuracy of 98% under Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve. The drawback of this method is that, UEE changes with respect to battery
charge, climate, and ambient noise. A little change in any of these parameters, which is very much likely
in the real world, significantly reduces this methods‟ ability to correctly detect the IED.
We present a more robust approach to generate an underlying pattern recognition statistical model
using HMM. This model once trained from emission data will outline a comparison between the trained
model and the observations, which results in the highest likelihood estimation that a given observation
came from a particular model. The reason for choosing HMM is that it is a robust model based upon well
defined mathematical theories and which has proven results from a variety of applications that it performs
well [8],[9].
2. Data Collection
Data collection for this project has been done using U3700 spectrum analyzer by Advantest and
VERT400 tri-band antenna. XR150U Business Two-Way Radio is the RF receiver selected for this
project. The operating frequency of the device is 450 – 470 MHz‟s. UEEs have very low power
emissions. For the purpose of clarity, a span has been fixed to 20 kHz and the distance from which
readings have been taken is 5 ft. Experimental setup for the data correction part is shown in figure 1. As
we can see the RF receiver is kept at the fixed distance from spectrum analyzer. In order to collect data,
the spectrum analyzer has been set to -30db level to appropriately display the signal on screen. On every
instance of unintended emissions, one sample of 1,001 points are stored on excel sheet. 60 samples of
data were collected altogether, 30 for device and 30 for noise.

Figure 1: Experimental Setup for Data Collection

3. Data Preparation
The signal recorded by the spectrum analyzer constitutes the plot of amplitude against frequency. The
reading was taken such that the central frequency always lies in the center of the span. The span of the
signal is of 20 KHz. Each successive observation has amplitude measured at the difference of 20Hz. A
typical signal is shown in figure 2a. Since the span is chosen such that the effect of UEE is visible around
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the center frequency, the observation near the center frequency is of importance to us. We considered 401
observations near the center and crop the rest of 600 observations. We limit ourselves with the
observation between 300 and 700. The resulting figure is shown in figure 2b.
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Figure 2a: Electromagnetic Emission with 1001 Observations
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Figure 2b: Electromagnetic Emission with 401 Observations

4. Methodology
Hidden markov model is represented by the tuple
following:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

= (M,N,A,B, ) where each element is defined as

M is the number of states and individual state is represented as S = {S1, S2,…,Sm}
N is the number of observations and individual observation is represented as O = {O 1,
O2,…,On}
A = {aij} is the state transition matrix where aij = P[qt+1 = Sj, / qt = Si], 1 i, j M
B = {bj(k)} is the emission transition matrix where b j(k) = P[Ok at t / qt = Sj], 1 i M and
1 k N
= { i} is the initial state probability distribution where i = P[q1 = Si], 1 i M

To represent any system as HMM described above, we need to have a Markov Chain and for this, we
should define some states such that there is some probability associated with transfer from one state to
another as stated in iii above. The change in amplitude of successive observation is taken as a state. The
observations are observed at a span of 20 Hz. We have classified the difference in successive observations
into five classes and these are taken as the 5 states that define HMM. The state definition is illustrated in
table 2a. Since HMM is a doubly embedded stochastic process, we need to define another stochastic
process apart from the markov chain. The set of visible observation sequence completes the components
required to define the HMM along with the markov chain. We have defined the amplitude of the signal
corresponding to the change in observation defined in state as the observation for our HMM. We have
classified the amplitude into six classes and these are taken as the 6 observations for our HMM. The
probability of observing one of the six observations defined in table 2b from a state gives the Emission
Probability Matrix (EPM). A typical HMM is represented in figure 3. Using the principle of counting, we
calculate the probability of observing a particular observation coming from a given state. Wolfram
Mathematica 7 was used to calculate the Transition Probability Matrix (TPM) and EPM as defined in iii
and iv respectively.
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State Name

Power
change
range (in dB)

State 1

> 4dB

State 2

(0, 4] dB

State 3

0 dB

State 4

[-4,0) dB

State 5

< -4dB
Table 2a: State Definition

Observation

Amplitude
range (in dB)

Observation 1

< -120dB

Observation 2

[-120, -115)dB

Observation 3

[-115, -110)dB

Observation 4

[-110, -105)dB

Observation 5

[-105, -100)dB

Observation 6

>= -100 dB

level

Table 2b: Observation Definition

Figure 3: HMM Representation

5. Experimental Results
We have two hidden markov models, one defined for the device and another defined for noise. A total
of 20 data samples, 10 from device and 10 from noise were fed as inputs to both models. The probability
that the model generated the sample data was calculated using Matlab 7.10. The corresponding device or
noise of the model that generated higher probability was selected as the one generating the signal. For
is HMM for the device and
is
example if P (O1/ ) > P (O1/ ) where O1 is an observation signal,
HMM for the noise, then we infer that O1 is emitted by . Our model was accurately able to identify the
source of all the input signals: all the 10 UEE signals emitted from the device were identified as device
signals and the rest of noise signals were accurately identified as noise. This is illustrated in table 3.

Number
of
times
identified as device
Number
of
times
identified as noise

Noise
Signal
0
10

Table 3: Experimental Results

Device
Signal
10
0

350
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6. Conclusions and Future Works
We have successfully employed HMMs to detect UEE. As per our knowledge, this is the first time
HMMs have been applied in identifying malicious devices through their unintended emissions. We have
proved that at a shorter distance, we can infer whether there is a malicious device or not even in a noisy
environment without using an amplifier. This research has provided a foundation for future work. The
first exploration to be done is to verify if this method works on longer distances than is considered here.
Another exploration would be to determine if this method can recognize between two or more RF
receivers instead of just differentiating between a single device and noise. Finally, another future direction
would be to build a model with various features other than taking the difference in amplitude of
successive observations.
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